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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 19 Sept **72**

TO: The Director

FROM: GACarver, Jr.

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

Attached is Tom Polgar's answer to Col. Kennedy's query relayed in Headquarters 1159 (also attached). I will give an oral gist of this to Kennedy to close the circuit.

George A. Carver, Jr. Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

cc: C/FE (EYES ONLY)

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CITE		_
HEADQUAR	TERS.	
	ADQUARTERS 1159	
1. E	NEMY POLICY STATEMENTS	
		SHO
NO EVID	ENCE OF RECENT CHANGE IN ENEMY TERRORI	SI POLICE IN
TERMS O	F TARGETS.	THEMY DOLLCY
2. F	OLLOWING ARE OUR CONCLUSIONS ON BASIC	ENEMI POLICI
REGARDI	ING TERRIORISM:	
A	. USEOF TERRIORISM IS INTEGRAL PART OF	VC/NVA
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	ICIAL POLICY IN SVN.	
В	ICIAL POLICY IN SVN TERRORISM AS PARTY INSTRUMENT OF WAR MARILY DIRECTED AT DESTRUCTION OF GVN	IS
	ICIAL POLICY IN SVN.	IS

C. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE NOT BEEN DIRECTED

D. TERRORIST ACTIONS ARE SOMETIMES DIRECTED

AGAINST U.S. INSTALLATIONS BUT NO INDIVIDUAL THEREIN

AGAINST INDIVISUAL U.S. PERSONNEL.

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IS SINGLED OUT.

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E. WHEREAS TERRORISM AND ASSASSINATION WERE FORMERLY EXCLUSIVE MISSIONS OF SELECT VC SECURITY SECTIONS AND SPECIAL ACTION (SAPPER) UNITS OF PARTY COMMITTEES, SUCH TASKS NOW ALSO UNDERTAKEN BY MILITARY PROSELYTING SECTIONS, UNDERGROUND AGENTS, SECRET GUERRILLAS, LOCAL FORCES.

F. VC MODUS OPERANDI IN IMPLEMENTATION OF
TBERORIST AND ASSASSINATION PLANS REMAINS CONSTANT.
ONCE TARGET SELECTED FOR SUCH ACTION, CASING OF TARGET
BEGINS, DOSSIER PREPARED ON HIM AND FORWARDED TO NEXT
HIGHER ECHELON OF PARTY STRUCTURE ALONG WITH REQUEST
FOR APPROVAL OF PLAN. AFTER STUDY, PARTY COMMITTEE
AT THAT LEVEL DECIDES ON PUNISHMENT TO BE ADMINISTERED.
NORMALLY NO ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS ARE CONDUCTED
ON TARGET-OF-OPPORTUNITY BASIS.

J. EXPERIENCE HAS BORNE OUT ABOVE POLICY RESPECTING
U.S. CIVILIANS AS THERE NO RECORD OF U.S. CIVILIANS HAVING
BEEN KILLED BY VC SINCE TET 68 ALTHOUGH OPPORTUNITIES
ABOUND IN SAIGON AND OUTLYING PROVINCES FOR VC TO DO SO. THIS

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APPLIES EQUALLY TO INDIVIDUAL U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL OUTSIDE

OF COMBAT AREAS.

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- 4. ENEMY POLICY RESPECTING U.S. PERSONNEL CAPTURED

 DURING COMBAT IS NOT TO KILL THEM, UNLESS CIRCUMSTANCES FORCE

 ENEMY DO SO, BUT TO TRANSFER THEM TO HANOI WHERE THEY KEPT

 FOR DIPLOMATIC BARGANING PURPOSES. THIS CONNECTION PLEASE

 SEE LATEST SUBSTANTIATING LAO DONG STATEMENT CONTAINED PARA

 1A(3) FVS 3Ø,911 OF 3 SEPT 72 WHICH ADDS "IT MORE DESIREABLE CAPTURE

 ONE AMERICAN ALIVE THAN TO KILL 3Ø OTHERS."
- 5. WHILE PRECEDING STATEMENT APPEARS INDIRECTLY TO SUGGEST U.S. PERSONNEL MIGHT BECOME PRIME TARGET FOR KIDNAPPINGS, IF READ IN CONTEXT, WE BELIEVE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MERELY EQUATING VALUE OF LIVE VERSUS DEAD AMERICANS RELATIVE TO BARGAIN POTENTIAL, RATHER THAN DEPARTING FROM CURRENT POLICY OUTLINED ABOVE.
- EXCLUSION OF U.S. PERSONNEL FROM VC TERRORIST ACTION AND CONCLUDE EXCLUSION IS BASED LAO DONG DECISION.
- 7. THERE NO EVIDENCE IN LATEST LAO DONG RESOLUTION
 13 OR OTHER REPORTS TO INDICATE U.S. PERSONNEL ARE TARGETS

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FOR VC/NVA TERRORIST ACTION. THERE IS, HOWEVER, OVERWHELM-ING EVIDENCE THAT GVN PERSONNEL ARE DEFINITELY TARGETS.

RESOLUTION 13 EXPLICIT ON THIS POINT AND URGES ASSASSINATION OF TYRANTS, (AND WE HAVE SEEN IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS POLICY).

FURTHER, ASSASSINATION LISTS ARE TO BE READY FOR USE ON ANNOUNCEMENT OF CEASEFIRE AND ENSUING PERIOD OF CONFUSION.

- RESOLUTION 13 AS TARGETS, ARE CERTAINLY INCLUDED. THIS BORNE OUT BY ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATIONS OF PRIME MINISTER HUONG IN FEBRUARY 69 AND GENERAL NGUYEN VAN KIEM, THIEU'S MILITARY CABINET CHIEF IN MARCH 69, AND SUCCESSFUL MURDERS OF LE VAN TRI, MINISTER OF EDUCATION IN JANUARY 69 AND PROFESSOR NGUYEN VAN BONG, HEAD OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE SAIGON, ON 10 NOVEMBER 71. CONFESSED KILLERS OF BONG STATED THEY ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF LABOR LEADER TRAN QUOC BUU IN SEPTEMBER 71.
- 9. AS U.S. ELECTION PERIOD APPROACHES, AND AS HANOI'S
 MILITARY PLANS ARE FOILED, THERE COULD BE REVERSAL VC
 TERRORIST POLICY TOWARDS U.S. PERSONNEL. ONE OMINOUS SIGN
 IS IN DRV/PRG STATEMENTS AND HANOI'S INDIRECT SANCTION OF ARAB

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TERROR IN MUNICH CONTAINED ARMY PAPER QUAN DOI NHA DAN, 13 SEPT 72.

POSSIBLE CHANGE IN ENEMY TERRORIST POLICY TOWARDS U.S. PERSONNEL WE BELIEVE THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE ON A SHORT TERM BASIS.

HANOI IS AWARE HIGH VALUE WHICH USG AND AMERICAN PUBLIC PLACE ON AMERICAN LIVES AND ADVERSE EFFECT SUCH TERRORIST ACTIVITY COULD HAVE ON U.S. PUBLIC OPINION. AS COURTING U.S. PUBLIC OPINION IS ONE OF HANOI'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, WE DOUBT IT WOULD FOLLOW ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST ROUTE, AT LEAST DURING PRE-ELECTION PHASE.

HIGHEST LEVELS, IS VERY SENSITIVE TO DANGERS OF VC TERRORIST POLICY. WITH RESPECT TO SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS, ONLY AMBASSADOR BUNKER IS GUARDED WITH FULL CONSISTANCY. WEYAND, WHITEHOUSE AND COS ARE MISTLY ACCOMPANIED BY SECURITY PERSONNEL, BUT NOT ALWAYS. BELOW THAT LEVEL EVERYBODY IS ON HIS OWN. MAJOR INSTALLATIONS ARE FAIRLY WELL GUARDED.

12. CHOICE, AS WE FOUND, BOILD DOWN TO ESTABLISHING
SECURITY PRACTICES WHICH WOULD BE EFFECTION BUT ALSO MOST
ONEROUS TO INDIVIDUALS OR TO TAKE CALCULATED RISKS BASED
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ON ASSESSMENT OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION, ENEMY INTENTIONS
AND LAWS OF PROBABILITY. GIVEN EXISTING SITUATION IN VIETNAM
WHICH PRODUCES SUFFICIENT STRAINS AND TENSIONS ON ITS OWN, I
WOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT TO PUT OR SUGGEST ADDITIONAL CONTROLS
ON MOVEMENTS OF U.S. PERSONNEL. IN THIS DECISION I AM ALSO
INFLUCNCED BY FACT THAT OUR NUMBERS HERE ARE SUCH THAT
EFFECTIVE PROTECTION COULD NOT BE PROVIDED EXCEPT UNDER
MOST RIGIDLY REGIMENTED CONDITONS, WHICH SIMPLY NOT
WARRANTED UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. E2 IMPDET

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